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Abstract 
The study was conducted in eastern Ethiopia where the Somali and 
Oromo ethnic groups live. The main purpose was to examine the roles and 
challenges of the indigenous conf lict resolution mechanisms practised as 
an alternative to modern methods among the Ittu Oromo and Issa Somali 
clans. The study employed a qualitative research approach under which key 
informant interviews, focus group discussions, observations and informal 
discussions were conducted. Key informants and focus group discussants 
were selected purposively. It was found that territorial expansion, resource 
competition and cattle raiding were considered as the main causes of violent 
conf lict in the area. Boundary disputes between the two regions have been 
associated not only with the accessibility of resources, but also with issues 
of identity. According to the participants, the indigenous institutions 
can play a major role in preventing and resolving intra-ethnic conf licts. 
* Zigale Tamir Tenaw is assistant professor in the Department of Gender and Development 





There are cases of government support for indigenous institution leaders, 
especially where there is proximity between such leaders and the current 
political system. Government intervention in the indigenous systems can 
also result, however, in the weakening of customary institutions in the 
area. The absence of a single common binding indigenous institution that 
governs inter-ethnic conf lict in the area is another challenge for indigenous 
systems of conf lict resolution. Indigenous institutions can deal effectively 
with many conf licts caused by the above mentioned factors, but since they 
also have certain limitations, serious thought should be given to the option 
of appropriately integrating modern and indigenous institutions.
Keywords: conflict resolution, indigenous institutions, resource competition, 
territorial expansion. 
Introduction 
Ethiopian pastoralists inhabit the arid and semi-arid parts of the country. 
They have been a socially, economically and politically marginalised and 
disadvantaged minority group of people. They have been overlooked in 
local development plans, and their movements have been restricted by 
regional boundary demarcations and by inter- and intra-ethnic conf licts. 
Their farming has been severely hampered by the harsh climate and 
a degraded environment. They are widely dispersed over an extensive 
territory, perhaps as much as 40 to 45 percent of the area of the country, 
while they constitute approximately 10 to 12 percent of the total population 
(Rahmato 2007:3). Pastoral and agro-pastoral communities have been 
competing for access to and control of scarce resources, and for dominance. 
Consequently, individuals as well as social, political, economic, and 
religious groups are involved in conf lict at different levels and for different 
reasons. 
The study area is prone to serious and frequent conf lict. According to key 
informants and focus group discussants, the major causes for conf lict 
in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas are territorial expansionary moves, 
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competition over declining resources, cattle raiding and counter raiding. 
After the introduction and implementation of ethnic based boundaries, the 
issue of administrative boundaries between Somali and Oromo regions in 
general and Ittu and Issa clans in particular has become another source of 
conf lict in the area. 
The life of the pastoralists depends on the quality and quantity of their 
livestock and its products, which are interrelated with the availability of 
pasture and water, and the health of the livestock. Both water sources and 
natural pastures are becoming insufficient during periods of drought. 
When pastoralists need to move their herds in search of pasture and water 
sources, there are frequent clashes over scarce resources. Oba (1992:1) 
argues that extended drought periods have the potential to catalyse 
resource-based conf licts in pastoral areas, where resources are shared 
among communities. 
The Ittu and Issa clans have experienced a long history of negotiating access to 
and the use of available pasture and water points through negotiation. However, 
the stock of natural resources, particularly pasture, water points and forests, 
has become degraded because of the occurrence of drought and over grazing. 
As a result, free movement of pastoralists within and across boundaries has 
been restricted. Cousins (1996:44) points out that such mobility restriction, 
resource scarcity and frequent conflicts bring about instability and tension 
within and between pastoral and agro-pastoral groups. 
The methods for conf lict resolution and peacebuilding in the study 
area arise from both indigenous and modern institutions. However, the 
pastoralist societies acknowledge that the indigenous mechanisms of 
conf lict resolution are more practicable in dealing with the root causes 
of conf lict and establishing sustainable peace. Peace agreements found 
through the process of mediation by indigenous institutions have the 
most legitimacy and the highest chances of success. In areas where for 
different reasons the state cannot prevent and solve inter-ethnic conf lict, 
the role of indigenous institutions becomes a very significant alternative. 
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By providing specialised rules as tools to address peculiar problems related 
to the exigencies of time and place, they can forestall and resolve conf lict, 
foster coordination and cooperation in jointly undertaken activities, and 
promote reconciliation of varied interests. 
This study is therefore meant to examine the indigenous institutions as an 
alternative way of dealing with conf lict in the Issa Somali and Ittu Oromo 
clans in eastern Ethiopia. The discussion focuses on the major causal 
factors that lead to violent conf licts, and on the roles and challenges of the 
indigenous institutions.
2. Materials and methods
2.1 Study area
The study was conducted in eastern Ethiopia where the Issa Somali and 
Ittu Oromo practise different modes of production – pastoral and agro-
pastoral. Both clans are Cushitic speaking, predominantly Muslim, and 
have somewhat similar socio-cultural practices. Under the Imperial regime, 
the areas of the different Oromo clans were classified and administered as 
Gara Guracha Awraja (less than a province but greater than a district) 
while the areas of different Somali clans were Gurgura Awraja. Under the 
Derg regime, the Somali clans in the area were administered and named 
as Issa Awraja while the areas of different Oromo clans were administered 
as Gara Guracha Awraja where they were administered under Hararghe 
province. However, after the introduction of ethnic based federalism 
in 1991, the Issa of Somali and the Ittu of Oromo clans were separated 
into two regional states and administered by their respective regions. 
They were named the Oromia National Regional State and the Somali 
National Regional State, respectively. 
The Issa clan inhabits Shinille zone of Somali region, and borders Djibouti 
in the north, Somaliland in the east; Jijiga zone in the southeast; and 
Oromia and Afar regions in the south and west respectively. This zone is 
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part of the arid and semi-arid lowlands. The dominant clan groups in the 
zone are the Issa, Gurgura, Gedabursi and Hawiya. Five of the six woreda 
(district) towns are located along the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway line. 
Some villages of Afdem and Mieso woredas are situated slightly off the main 
Awash-Mille road. The Ittu Oromo clan currently inhabits Mieso district 
in the western Hararghe zone of the Oromia regional state of Ethiopia. 
It is bordered on the south by Guba Koricha, on the west by the Afar, on the 
north by the Somali region, on the east by Doba and on the south east by 
Chiro. Major towns in Mieso district include Arba Bordode, Asabot, Kora 
and Mieso (Temam 2010:29). 
These two clan groups (Ittu and Issa) who are sharing a long boundary and 
competing with each other for scarce resources are the major contenders 
in the study area. Numerous conf licts have taken place between the local 
Oromos and Somalis in Mieso. Since the 2004 referendum about the 
disputed boundary between Oromia and Somali National Regional States, 
over 2 500 people have been displaced from their homes. The study area is 
therefore a most conf lict prone and volatile area (Mesfin 2006:22–24). 
2.2 Data collection and analysis
A qualitative research approach was employed to attain the intended objectives 
of the study. Both primary and secondary data were collected through a 
variety of methods and approaches. Primary data were collected by using key 
informant interviews, focus group discussions, observations and informal 
discussions. Key informants and focus group discussants were selected from 
each village purposively. The researcher selected respondents according to sex, 
age, level of education and position in the society (community elders, district 
officials, religious and customary leaders). Six focus group discussions, each 
comprising 6 to 8 persons of the same sex but different age groups, sampled 
from each village, were conducted in the area. For cross triangulation, in-depth 
interviews with influential community members were conducted. Informal 
discussions were also held with government officials, development agents, 
religious leaders and local elders. 
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In addition, secondary data were collected through an extensive review of 
existing literature and official reports to cover current issues in relation to 
indigenous systems in conflict resolution. The descriptive study analysis 
technique was employed to analyse, interpret and discuss the qualitative data. 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1 The nature of conflict 
Conf lict and conf lict resolution within and between the Somali and 
Oromo pastoral ethnic groups of Eastern Ethiopia are not new phenomena. 
Centuries of interaction between the two groups of people have also created 
a complex pattern of ethnic and linguistic group relationships. Currently, 
there is the issue of where the administrative boundary between the two 
Regional States should be drawn. In the areas concerned, there are mixed 
cultural, linguistic and ethnic affiliations, and competition for scarce 
resources (water sources and pastureland) – which lead to violent conf licts. 
Moreover, the emergence of local tribal elites on both sides exacerbates the 
problems with the boundary dispute (Mesfin 2006:5). 
Both intra- and inter-ethnic conf licts over the use and control of natural 
resources as well as territorial expansionary moves are everyday business in 
the pastoral areas of Ethiopia in general and in the study area in particular. 
According to local elders in the area, there were frequent incidences of 
violent conf lict among the different clan groups, resulting in large-scale 
destruction of livelihoods, loss of lives and massive displacement of people 
from their original residences to new settlement areas. For instance, the Issa 
Somali were displaced from Bordede of Oromia region and are currently 
settled in Mulu district (the Hawiya clan) and a new settlement site, named 
Hardim. The Ittu Oromo were also displaced from Bike of Somali region 
and are currently settled in Mieso district. Such displacement of people 
was due to competition over territorial expansion and the dissatisfaction of 
the Issa clan over the results of the 2004 referendum in the disputed areas. 
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According to key informants, the nature of conf lict has been changed 
from time to time, and the opportunity of the two rival groups to access 
modern automatic weapons has made the conf licts more devastating than 
the earlier forms of confrontation. The conf lict has also acquired a new 
dimension after the introduction of ethnic based boundary demarcation 
in Ethiopia in 1991. 
3.2 Major causes of conflict 
No single conceptualisation of conf lict can capture the variety of intervening 
variables that are at play in practical conf lict situations. These variables 
include cultural, historical, political, and economic motivations of the 
various parties involved in the conf lict. Real world conf lict situations are 
further complicated by the actions of secondary conf lict parties expressing 
their interests through the primary contenders or actors (Adan and Pkalya 
2005:1). The history of the region includes massive population movements 
pushed by different natural and manmade factors, and pulled by the search 
for better pasture and water sources (Kandagor 2005; Brock-Utne 2001; 
Markakis 1993). 
The major causes of conf lict in the study areas were identified by most 
key informants and focus group discussants as: territorial expansion, 
competition over scarce resources (pasture land and water points), livestock 
raids and counter raids triggered by prolonged drought, ethnic rivalries, 
and the revenge tradition. Resource scarcity and competition in the area 
arise from the natural resource base, population pressures, environmental 
degradation and the resulting climate change. A study conducted by Beyene 
(2007) in Mieso District of Eastern Ethiopia points out that factors like 
resource scarcity and competition, customary norms, power asymmetry 
and livestock raids are major causes of conf licts in the area. According to 
Mkutu (2001), the overall conf licts, animosities and competitions among 
pastoralists in the horn of Africa are basically due to the following reasons: 
scarcity of resources, poverty, pastoral mobility in search of pasture land 
and water points, historical relations and animosity, and government 
policies which lead to the marginalisation of some clans. 
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When ethnically based regional boundaries were introduced, access and 
ownership rights began to depend more on ethnic membership than on 
traditional negotiations. Besides physical boundaries that restricted free 
movement, the ethnic element of resource ownership also had to be coped 
with (Debelo 2012:524–525). 
In order to arrive at a better understanding and assessment of the eastern 
Ethiopian indigenous institutions for conflict resolution, the respondents in 
the area were requested to identify factors that lead pastoral and agro-pastoral 
communities into conflict. In the following few sub-sections, their responses 
are briefly summarised and endorsed by references to relevant literature.
3.2.1 Resource scarcity 
Key informants and group discussants described that the (agro-)pastoral 
areas are in a state of instability because of competition over scarce 
resources. Climatic changes have led to desertification and narrowed the 
belts of pasture and water sources, drastically reducing access to rangeland 
upon which the pastoralist mode of production depends. Supported 
by government-sponsored projects and changes in land use, sedentary 
encroachment has further diminished the range of pastoral mobility. Since 
the arid and semi-arid areas of the country where pastoral populations live 
receive insufficient rain during the year, mobility is important to make use 
of resources in different ecosystems during different seasons. However, in 
the current situation, mobility within and across regional boundaries has 
been restricted because of resource scarcity and ethnic based animosity.
In pastoral and agro-pastoral areas, the stock of natural resources, 
particularly grazing lands and water points, is shrinking from time to 
time as a result of several factors, including the occurrence of prolonged 
drought, environmental degradation, expansion of agriculture, and 
human and animal population growth. There is no doubt that all these 
factors intensify resource scarcity and competition for pasture and water 
sources in the area among the pastoralists. When pastoral groups compete 
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to maximise their share of the limited grazing resources and water points, 
the struggle inevitably leads to violent conf lict. Pastoral conf licts occur 
mostly during the dry seasons when the stock of key resources declines. 
Territorial encroachments, cattle raids and scarce resource competition 
between Ittu and Issa clan groups have resulted in conf lict since the 1960s 
(Oba 1992:15; Blench 1996:3). Fratkin and Mearns (2003:112) stated that 
pastoralists are facing more pressures and challenges onto their way of 
life than ever before because of the loss of pasturelands to private farms, 
ranches and national parks; changes to other types of land use; increased 
commoditisation with concomitant inequality within the livestock 
economy; out-migration of poor pastoralists; and periodic dislocations 
brought about by drought, famine, and civil war. 
Pastoralism as a way of life requires movement within and across regional 
boundaries in search for pasture and drinking water for their livestock. But 
the current situation is not conducive to a mobile way of life across regional 
boundaries because of enmity among ethnic groups. Consequently, 
territorial expansion becomes one of the main strategies for control over 
scarce resources. Such boundary claims resulted in violent conf lict between 
the two clans in the area. For instance, in 2004, Somali Region claims that 
21 kebeles (small units of administration in a district) should fall within its 
regional administrations. These events led to a referendum in November 
2004, which allocated only one of the contested kebeles to Somali regional 
state and the remaining twenty to Oromia regional state. As a result, the 
Issa and other Somali clans were not satisfied about the result and they 
made indiscriminate violent attacks on Ittu clans. A finding of empirical 
research done in Sudan indicates that when land becomes scarce and agro-
pastoralists come under increasing pressure, various stakeholders will lay 
claims to land and promote a history of conf lict over land and access to 
natural resources (Taha 2007:15).
Bassi (1997) also argues that recent clan and inter-ethnic conf licts are 
related to national political processes. The absence of clearly demarcated 
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regional, zonal, district and kebele level boundaries in eastern Ethiopia 
led to stiff competition and territorial expansive moves by several ethnic 
groups. Though the two regional state governments (Oromia and Somali) 
tried to resolve the boundary dispute through the referendum in 2004, 
their efforts did not bring a long-lasting solution. In fact, Mesfin (2006:22) 
argues that the referendum intensified the conf lict and the violence into a 
full-f ledged war. Several incidents of violence were triggered in 2004 in the 
Mieso district and its surroundings after the referendum, and since then 
violent conf lict has become a day-to-day activity. As a result of this, people 
were displaced, massacred and injured, houses were burnt and properties 
and cattle looted.
3.2.2 Livestock raiding
Livestock raiding is a widespread and long standing form of violence 
among many Ethiopian pastoral communities. Raiding livestock is an act 
of group invasion or forceful attack by an outside pastoralist group with 
the purpose of robbing livestock (Mkutu 2001:17–18). Community elders 
revealed that livestock raids and counter raids were regular phenomena 
between Issa and Ittu clans. Traditionally, there was the approval of elders 
and considerable preparation and coordination to raid cattle among Issa 
and Ittu clans. Raiding campaigns by young warriors had to be sanctioned 
by elders and evolved within strict rules governing preparation, engagement 
and disengagement. 
The main driving factors for cattle raids were associated with social, 
cultural and economic issues of the pastoral and agro-pastoral societies. 
Pastoralist communities raided each other mainly for prestige, revenge, 
and to maintain their strength and power over the opponent parties. 
Cattle raiding was seen as a heroic deed and was praised through songs 
and poems. It has been used as an important mechanism for restocking 
when pastoralist communities experience loss of cattle through droughts, 
epidemic disease and conf licts. Michael (2000:2) states that motivations 
for cattle raiding attributed to East African pastoralists include the desire 
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for prestige, retaliation, loot, and trophies. The motive driving victimised 
ethnic groups to commit cattle raiding emanates from their desire to claim 
the death of favourite oxen, acquire or reacquire looted cattle, expand their 
herds, repair stock losses, and amass the stock needed for bride wealth 
payments. Adan and Pkalya (2005) describe that pastoralist communities 
raided each other’s livestock, mainly to replenish their herds depleted 
by severe droughts, disease, raiding or other calamities. Raids were also 
undertaken to expand grazing lands, raise bride price and to a lesser extent 
to demonstrate the physical courage among warriors. Elders blessed the 
raiders before they set off. 
Continuing the historical pattern, livestock raiding and counter raiding 
between the two clans is still one of the major causes for the occurrence of 
violent conf licts. In 2000, there was violent conf lict between the Ittu and 
Issa clans in Dima, a small town between Assebot and Mieso, inhabited 
by the Oromo clan as well as some Issa cattle herders. The conf lict started 
when the Ittu Oromos raided around 500 cattle and attacked Issa’s herders. 
The Issa, afterwards, took revenge by mobilising their forces, attacked 
Dima and indiscriminately killed around fifty people. The situation 
escalated into violent conf lict, not only because of the cattle raiding, but 
also because of a drought and scarce resources. 
3.2.3 The need for territorial expansion
From the previous two sub-sections and from the literature, it becomes clear 
how interrelated the main causes of the inter- and intra-clan conflicts are. 
In the literature, one finds corroborating summaries such as the following.
According to Homer-Dixon (2007:3–4) and Mahmoud (2006:2), 
competition for scarce resources, enemy stereotypes, marginalisation of 
a society, and uncontrolled proliferation of weapons are found to be the 
causes of conf licts in (agro-)pastoral areas. Inter-ethnic conf lict between 
pastoralists has been interpreted as competition for scarce resources. 
Raiding cattle of traditional enemies is a means to expand rangelands, 
restock herds and improve social status. Mahmoud (2006:4) also states that 
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the policy of ethnic based regionalisation, ethnic politics at the national 
level and ethnic based boundary demarcations are major causes of conf licts 
among groups of pastoralists in eastern Ethiopia.
The need for territorial expansion may therefore be used as a convenient 
umbrella term in a situation where several urgent problems can be traced 
back to a basic shortage of land. After all, land is the basic requirement for 
all pastoral and agro-pastoral farming.
3.2.4 Other factors 
Other factors that affect the quality and availability of land have already 
been mentioned, but deserve more emphasis. Firstly, there is the occurrence 
of drought, which can be an annual or a cyclical phenomenon, and which 
can be of shorter or longer duration. During severe shortage of rainfall 
in pastoral areas, the groups residing in the area try to spread over more 
land. Sometimes, different pastoral groups move to the same place and 
want to use the same scarce resource, which cause stiff competition leading 
to conf lict. 
Secondly, local elders emphasised the problem of land alienation for 
investment or other purposes. Development projects might instigate or 
trigger existing or new conf licts in the area. For instance, a road from 
Bordede to Gelemso town and one that links Serkama and the surrounding 
kebeles to Dire Dawa city – although they are constructed by the Oromia 
regional state in collaboration with the local people – aggravate the already 
existing conf licts between Issa Somali and Ittu Oromo clans in the region. 
Communal property of pastoralists’ extensive pastureland has been given 
to investors. For example, Indian investors in Mieso at Bordede area took 
an extensive piece of land to grow Jatropha plants. Market corridors are also 
sources of conf lict between Ittu and Issa clans. Mesfin (2006:21) points out 
that violent conf lict between Issa and Ittu erupted in 2003 at Bordede town 
to control the custom point and tax collection area that connect the eastern 
region to the centre of the country. 
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3.3 Dynamics of conflict 
Historically, there were inter-ethnic conf licts about pasture lands and 
water points in the time of Emperor Haile Selassie (1930–1974), during 
the Derg regime (1974–1991) and even before. There have been conf licts 
between Somali Issa and Oromo clans as well as central government backed 
campaigns against the ambitious territorial claims of the Issa. However, 
after the introduction of ethnically based regional boundaries in 1991, 
the nature, behaviours and trends of conf lict varied from time to time 
according to the root and immediate causes of conf lict (Mesfin 2006:17). 
Community elders point out that the relationships among pastoral clans of 
different ethnic groups are increasingly becoming complex and dynamic 
in response to change in social, economic, political and cultural settings. 
In the past, the need to access and use resources was the main source 
of conf lict. In the current situation, the right to own a scarce resource 
through territorial claims has also become a major cause of conf lict among 
these ethnic groups. Conf lict has been changed in its shape and nature over 
time from a simple confrontation by using traditional weapons to war-like 
scenarios with modern and more sophisticated weaponry. 
It is believed that most of the states in the horn of Africa are considered 
to be fragile states or even stateless societies. The region is therefore 
regarded as very conf lict prone and characterised by proliferation and 
circulation of modern firearms. The relative ease of acquisition and low 
cost of these illegal guns enable the pastoral communities to guarantee 
a sustained market (Mkutu 2001:18). Goldsmith (2006) estimates that 
there are between 150 000 and 200 000 firearms in the Karamoja region 
of Uganda alone. The exact number of small arms in the hands of pastoral 
communities is difficult to assess, but it is clear that the threat posed by 
them is enormous. A study conducted by Aredo and Ame (2002) indicates 
that the pastoral conf lict is changing its nature with devastating effects. 
In 2000, three major conf licts have occurred between major rival pastoral 
groups, i.e. Borena versus Gari, Merihan versus Digidia, and Degidia 
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versus Borena in Oromia region. These conf licts resulted in the death of 
hundreds of people. In the study area, a referendum was held in 2004 in the 
Oromia and Somali regional states about the disputed districts and kebeles. 
Following the referendum result, violent conf lict erupted between Issa and 
other Oromo clans. Consequently, new settlement camps were formed at 
Hardim and Meiso. 
3.4 The role of indigenous institutions in conflict resolution
Pastoral and agro-pastoral communities have two conf lict-resolution 
options: the formal (modern) and the informal (indigenous). The modern 
systems of conf lict resolution are conducted in the court through litigation 
and are officially recognised by the government. Their procedures are 
more strictly examined and monitored for signs of impartiality, entrenched 
inequities and lack of due process. Indigenous systems of conf lict 
resolution are an ancient set of practices in almost all the pastoral societies 
in Ethiopia. They are grassroots approaches, and essentially consist of 
time-proven applications of third party mediation and arbitration. Watson 
(2001:6) describes how indigenous institutions include local cultural forms 
of organisation, for example locally elected and appointed, or hereditary 
leaders and elders. They have customary rules and regulations as well as 
indigenous practices and knowledge regulating the access to resources. 
According to the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
(2008:26–27), leaders of indigenous institutions play a significant role 
in local and grassroots communities in relation to socio-cultural and 
economic development, and the administration of justice in the modern 
political system. They play two important roles: a proactive role to promote 
social cohesion, peace, harmony and co-existence; and a reactive role in 
resolving disputes which have already occurred. 
According to key informants, when compared with modern institutions, 
the indigenous mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conf licts 
are less complex, save time, money and energy and give chances for parties 
to actively participate in the solving of problems. Currently, however, there 
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is no single common binding indigenous institution that can govern inter-
ethnic conf lict. Consequently, the modern institutional approach is usually 
applied to handle inter-ethnic conf lict among pastoral communities. 
When intra-ethnic conf lict occurs, however, the indigenous institution 
leaders have power to sanction and penalise the perpetrators and enforce 
them to pay blood money. Each clan group in the area has their own 
process of conf lict prevention and resolution based on the values, norms 
and cultural rules of the community concerned. 
The key purpose of indigenous institutions in conf lict resolution is 
therefore to find appropriate solutions to the existing conf licts – solutions 
based on the values, norms, complexity and culture of the society, and 
accordingly of significance to the conf licting parties. Most important 
elements involved in such mechanisms are the traditions of forgiveness 
and of respect for elders because of their symbolic authority to enforce 
decisions and implement compensation. Indigenous conf lict resolution 
typically incorporates consensus building based on open discussions to 
exchange information and clarify issues. Conf licting parties are more likely 
to accept guidance from these mediators than from other sources because 
an elder’s decision does not entail any loss of face and is backed by social 
pressure. The end result is ideally a sense of unity, shared involvement and 
responsibility, and dialogue among groups otherwise in conf lict (USAID 
2005:27). Tafere (2006:51) and Assefa (2001:27) state that indigenous 
institutions are time-tested and effective for handling conf licts that arise 
in the Horn of Africa in general and in eastern Ethiopia in particular. 
The pastoral and agro-pastoral people tend to refer any disputes to the local 
mediation process where conf licts are addressed in a less rigid manner, 
compared to the modern court where adjudication is largely based on 
standardised and uncontested rules. 
Indigenous institutions can present locally meaningful solutions to 
problems of collective action confronting individuals and groups in the 
various particular environments they inhabit. In addition to resolving 
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conf lict, they can foster coordination and cooperation in jointly undertaken 
activities, and promote the reconciliation of varied interests. Indigenous 
institutions are indeed relevant to conf lict resolution, reconciliation and 
development because they ref lect fundamental understandings among 
affected individuals, who must deal with each other within the context of 
a particular problem arena and overcome dilemmas of collective action.
Research conducted in Kenya indicates that lasting conf lict resolution can 
only be achieved by the parties themselves, based on strengthened local 
institutional capability (including indigenous institutions and local civil 
society organisations), and key local individuals. However, government 
and outside agencies have an essential role to play in creating the external 
conditions for such local settlements, and in supporting local institution 
capability (Adan and Pkalya 2005:52–53). People in Africa in general and 
in the Horn of Africa in particular have effective indigenous mechanisms 
to prevent, mitigate, manage and resolve conf licts, and to draw the 
attention of the governments of the Horn countries to use these indigenous 
mechanisms to make the region more stable and peaceful (Assefa 2001:27). 
3.4.1 Process of indigenous conflict resolution among the Ittu Oromo clan
Like other African pastoralists, Ethiopian pastoral and agro-pastoral 
societies in general and the Ittu Oromo and Issa Somali clans in particular 
have their own procedures to manage and resolve conf lict through 
indigenous systems. According to key informants, the Ittu Oromo clan has 
its own rules and practices of governance for various maladjustments and 
happenings particularly with regard to conf lict prevention and resolution. 
Compensation of a victim’s family (known as guma) is one mechanism in 
indigenous conf lict resolution. The type of offence (wound, amputation, 
murder, rape, etc.) determines the amount of blood money. When someone 
has killed an individual, third and independent parties will intervene and 
try to inf luence the victim’s family not to take revenge. Until the murderer’s 
clan negotiates with and compensates the victim’s clan, the offender will go 
and hide himself somewhere else. Based on the guma system, the offender’s 
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family will pay 2000 Ethiopian birr, 3 meters white garment, an ox to be 
slaughtered, and a quintal of maize for the burial ceremony. This is called 
kefenafi kefera (soothing of anger and drying of tears). After the payment 
of kefenafi kefera, the amount of blood money for compensation will be 
decided (100 cattle for unintentional killing and 150 cattle for intentional 
killing). Within two weeks, the first phase of blood money, called immimetti1 
and consisting of 15 to 20 cattle, has to be paid to the deceased’s family. 
Then, a larger and wider appointment for conflict resolution at clan level 
will be organised. The elders will order the process of guma for kondale 
karra2 to follow up the fair contribution of cattle from each of the offender’s 
clan members. The offender’s clan will assign responsible individuals 
(known as seglen) to collect cattle for compensation from their own clan 
members. Then, the murderer has responsibility to look after those cattle 
until the seglen members carry out their duties. As self-punishment, the 
murderer will exclude himself from certain activities, for instance, having 
any sexual relationship with his wife, living and eating together with his 
relatives, entering the house at the front, and washing his body. When the 
seglen have executed their responsibilities, a large temporary hut (dass) 
will be constructed as a meeting hall for the resolution ceremony. At this 
juncture the offender’s clan will slaughter an ox for this ceremony. The meat 
is divided into two equal parts, one for the offender’s and the other for the 
victim’s clan. The meat from the left front leg of the ox will not be eaten. 
The murderer who looks after the cattle for compensation at the nearby 
kraal3 will be given an audience. He will request an acquittal to make him 
free from all the sanctions. The brother of the deceased and the killer will 
be tied together by the meditcha (rope made of leather) and come together 
in front of the audience. Community elders and religious leaders will bless 
1 Immimetti means the immediate gift to compensate the sorrow of the deceased’s relatives.
2 Kondale karra is the elder who is responsible to enforce the offender’s clan to contribute 
blood money (guma) as compensation to the victim’s clan.




them to become as one and as brothers to each other. The rope symbolises 
the ending of their enmity and their uniting for peace and development. 
The deceased’s mother will lash butter on the hair and pour milk on the 
stomach of the belligerents so as to get rid of any evil spirit from their mind 
and stomach. They become relatives and inter-marriage is not allowed. 
This seclusion process may last for about one to three months and more. 
Finally, the remaining blood money for compensation will be paid and 
the victim’s clan members will share. Such a process of conf lict resolution 
(guma) is functional only among the Oromo clans in the area, and not in 
the Somali clans. 
In cases other than murder, as key informants said, the Ittu Oromo clan 
awards different amounts of compensation according to the type and 
extent of physical injuries, as indicated in the table below. 
Table 1: Compensation for physical injuries 
 No. Type of physical injury Amount of compensation
1. Loss of hand/arm •	 16 cattle and 15 cattle for left and right hand 
respectively. There is a belief that the left hand 
is considered as more important for making love, 
defending, etc. than the right hand.
2. Loss of leg •	 16 cattle, 2 oxen and 1 mule for left leg
•	 15 cattle, 2 oxen and 1 mule for right leg
3. Impairment of eye •	 19 cattle for each eye, or sometimes a gift of few 
cattle and a virgin girl to look after and guide him as 
a wife and compensation.
4. Rape •	 5 cattle for a virgin girl; 3 cattle for a non-virgin girl 
•	 5 cattle for a married woman 
Source: Field inquiry
103
Indigenous institutions as an alternative conflict resolution mechanism
3.4.2 Process of indigenous conflict resolution among the Issa Somali clan 
According to key informants, the process of indigenous conf lict resolution 
in this clan is based on consultation and open discussions between the 
disputant parties. Mediation is carried out by a person or persons of high 
social standing, commonly chiefs or elders, who use their social legitimacy 
and facilitative skills. Indigenous institution mediators are indeed better 
able than government-led interventions to address the causes and resolve 
the conf lict. Locally driven conf lict interventions do not only have better 
ability to design a process suited to the local context, but they also have 
valuable experience which can lead to much faster response than state- 
led initiatives. 
In accordance with Somali custom, elders are the key actors in the process 
of ending hostilities and negotiating agreements between disputing parties. 
The guurti elders (a council of clan elders that traditionally presides over 
a community) function as judge and jury, and their decisions are largely 
adhered to and respected. Most people would not consider deviating from 
the prescribed conf lict resolution mechanisms, largely because of the 
strong peer pressure and inculcated societal expectations. 
This clan’s process of conf lict resolution within the indigenous institution 
also focuses on reconciliation, stability, harmony and safety; and tries to 
reconcile individuals and groups on the basis of their cultural norms, values 
and practices. The institutional leaders impose different punishments on 
perpetrators based on the laws, rules and regulation of the indigenous 
institution. The amount and type of compensation for individuals or groups 
depend on the type and extent of offence (killing, amputation, wound, rape, 
etc). Loss of life during conf lict demands a complex negotiated process and 
the murderer’s families have to pay compensation of blood money (mag) to 
settle the conf lict. 
The most important process for resolving a murder-related conf lict case 
is through the intervention of elders and an independent third party. 
After discussion with the victim’s families, one camel, ritually named 
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axan,4 will be slaughtered and means there is a promise not to take revenge. 
The procedures of compensation for blood money are discussed between 
the elders of the clans involved in conf lict as well as an independent ‘third-
party’. In the first phase of negotiating blood money for compensation, the 
killer’s families will give kafan5 (a 3 meter white garment), kefera (a quintal 
of maize) and 2500 Ethiopian birr including khat (a mildly narcotic plant) 
for the burial ceremony. The family of the murderer hands over the gun to 
the victim’s family during the funeral ceremony. After the funeral ceremony, 
the amount of blood money will be decided (100 camels for unintentional 
killing and 150 camels for intentional killing). The killer’s families and 
clan members will not be allowed to move with their traditional as well as 
modern weapons during the process of conf lict resolution. Within 15 days, 
the first part of the mag has to be paid (usually comprising 15 to 20 camels) 
to the deceased’s families. The remaining compensation of blood money 
will be paid within 2 to 3 months after the initial agreement. All these 
steps of the conf lict resolution process and agreement will be recorded and 
documented by mediating elders and district officials. 
3.5 Challenges of the indigenous institutions
Currently, neither the guma nor the mag system of conf lict resolution is 
functioning to resolve inter-ethnic conf licts between Ittu Oromo and Issa 
Somali. When violent conf lict breaks out between the Ittu and the Issa, 
an intervention team composed of security forces, district officials and 
local elders is organised and rushes to the conf lict site. The conf lict parties 
are separated by force and fighting clansmen are disarmed. Once physical 
hostilities are controlled, a conf lict resolution process will be started by a 
peace and conf lict management team. The peace and conf lict management 
team will contain elders of both clans and district officials. 
The current situation of indigenous conf lict resolution is severely challenged 
by escalated resource competition, continuous boundary conf lict and cattle 
4 Axan designates the camel slaughtered at the funeral.
5 Kafan refers to the white garment used to cover a dead body before burial.
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raids and the involvement of administrative entities in intra-and inter-
ethnic conf licts. As the causes and frequencies of conf lict increase, both 
institutional leaders and local elders lose the interest and commitment to 
invest their time without sufficient salary or other incentives. 
In the name of collaboration with modern institutions, the historical 
structure of indigenous systems has become involved in political 
manipulation. The process of government intervention in the customary 
system is bringing about an increasing difference between the authority 
of elders recognised by district officials and that of community elders 
in remote rural areas. The district administrators treat customary elders 
differently according to their proximity to the political system. Directly 
or indirectly, government appointed elders have benefited financially 
from the district or non-governmental organisations (NGOs). As a 
result, elders assigned by district authorities are not in a position to settle 
conf lict according to the historical customary law; rather they serve to 
implement the modern administration system. Scholars argue that in the 
past decade government-sponsored elders of pastoral communities who 
engage in mediation and reconciliation are either paid by the government 
or by NGOs. Conf lict resolution thereby became a profitable activity for 
indigenous leaders who promote local government agendas in return for 
per diems, khat (native to east Africa and the Arabian Peninsula) and other 
personal incentives. At the regional level special budget lines for conf lict 
resolution were established, providing generous funding for politicians and 
government appointed elders (Hagmann 2006:26–27). 
There is also contradiction between modern and indigenous institutional 
courts. For instance, sometimes individuals convicted through an 
indigenous institution authority may appeal to the formal court, and 
then be released without any punishment. As a result, the trust of the 
pastoral community in the indigenous system of conf lict resolution has 
been degraded from time to time. The potential effectiveness of indigenous 
conf lict resolution is diminished where indigenous authority has eroded 
and formal authority has increased.
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4. Conclusion and recommendation
The complexities of causes of conf lict make it difficult to single out 
any single factor as the trigger for a given conf lict or series of conf lict 
manifestations. The major causes of conf licts in pastoral and agro-pastoral 
areas apparently result from socio-cultural, economic and political factors 
that reinforce a chain of causes which limits the availability, accessibility 
and control over scarce resources. In the past, the need to access resources, 
particularly grazing lands and water points, was the primary source of 
conf lict among pastoral and agro-pastoral societies. But now the question 
of ownership of these scarce resources has become pertinent, giving rise to 
territorial claims and competitive tension between the two ethnic groups. 
The pastoralists’ area, especially the Issa Somali’s extensive land, is not 
in a position to sustainably provide adequate pasture and water sources 
for their livestock because of the adverse effects of prolonged drought, 
insufficient rainfall, high temperature and over-grazing. There were, 
however, negotiations held with Ittu and other adjacent clan leaders to 
share the available resources when resource scarcity became very critical. 
Due to both natural and manmade disasters, however, sharing with and 
accessing scarce resources of the Ittu clan have become very difficult for 
the Issa. Thus, the primary need of the Issa gradually shifted from the 
question of accessing resources to controlling and utilising the resources 
through boundary claims and territorial expansion strategies. 
As among other pastoralists in Ethiopia, looting livestock was a widespread 
practice and long-standing form of violence among the Ittu and Issa 
pastoral communities. The historical factors driving the cattle raiding 
practices between the two clan groups were associated with the quest for 
prestige, the taking of revenge, the desire for heroism, the restocking after 
drought, the obtaining of bride price and the general increasing of income. 
However, in recent time, the extent and magnitude of inter-clan livestock 
raiding has decreased over time and has been replaced by small scale theft. 
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Other more recent conf lict-causing phenomena are the sudden killing of 
individuals and the animosity between the two clans. 
Indigenous institutions, based on the norms, values, cultural and 
traditional settings of the community, can play an important role in 
managing and resolving conf lict. The Ittu and Issa clans do have their own 
indigenous governance structures and processes of conf lict resolution. 
In these processes, settlement is usually achieved with compensation 
payment (blood money) for the victim’s families. However, in the process 
of conf lict resolution, the indigenous institution leaders’ capacity to 
convince the two opponent parties and to enforce the offenders to pay 
blood money for the victim’s families becomes a major challenge. The role 
of indigenous institution leaders in conf lict management and resolution 
has been degraded from time to time. 
Therefore, in order to promote sustainable peace in the area, indigenous 
institutions should be integrated with modern systems of conf lict 
resolution. This will require penetrating deliberations and creative 
planning about difficult adaptations from both sides, but it is a project 
that can be strongly recommended. A great deal of further research will 
obviously also be necessary. In collaboration with the Ministry of Federal 
Affairs, both Somali and Oromia regional state authorities should work 
hard to create awareness about tolerance, respecting each other and sharing 
the existing scarce resources regardless of manmade regional boundaries.
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